the former Soviet Union -threatens to obscure the fact that it is psychiatric power, not psychiatric diagnosis, that makes the political abuse of psychiatry not merely possible but inevitable (2) .
The misleading focus on psychiatric diagnosis is illustrated by the essay, 'Concepts of disease and the abuse of psychiatry in the USSR,' (3). The authors write:
'There is a strong prima facie case linking the abuse of psychiatry with difficulties about the concept of mental illness. ... However, a survey of recent Soviet literature showed that the concept of disease employed in the former USSR (where abuse was for a time widespread) was similar to its counterpart in the UK and USA in being strongly scientific in nature. ' These sentences imply that a more truly scientific classification of mental illnesses ( 'An important vulnerability factor, therefore, for the abuse of psychiatry, is the subjective nature of the observations on which psychiatric diagnosis currently depends' (3).
However, the crucial issue is not subjectivity versus objectivity, but coercion versus co-operation, wielding power versus not wielding power. Art historians, drama critics, musicologists, and many other scholars also make subjective classifications; however, lacking state-sanctioned power over persons, their classifications do not lead to anyone's being deprived of life, liberty, or property. Surely, the plastic surgeon's classification of beauty is subjective. But because the plastic surgeon cannot treat his or her patient without the patient's consent, there cannot be any political abuse of plastic surgery. It is as simple, and inconvenient, as that.
The preoccupation of Western psychiatrists with Soviet psychiatric abuses is, in my opinion, merely another symptom of a moral disorder endemic to all of psychiatry. As the title of the essay by Fulford et al indicates, the authors prejudge the nature of the problem by assuming that the abuse of psychiatry in the USSR was distinctively different from its abuse in the West or, for that matter, in National Socialist Germany or Czarist Russia. This premise is false. In addition, Western psychiatry's preoccupation with Soviet psychiatric abuses has obscured the distinction between abuses motivated and made possible by a combination of professional authority, human rapacity, and personal gullibility, and abuses motivated and made possible by political ideology, law, and the human need for conformity. The former type of abuse, as George Bernard Shaw observed in The Doctor's Dilemma, is endemic to the professions. 'All professions,' he observed, 'are conspiracies against the laity' (7). However, a physician in his private office can defraud a person only by first persuading him that he is sick when he is not, or if he is sick that he will profit from a worthless treatment, and so forth. This kind of abuse can occur only with the co-operation/collusion of the patient/client, and must be distinguished from the abuse of the victim (who is not a patient or client in the proper sense) byforce, for which his co-operation is not required. Because the latter type of 'abuse' requires the deployment of state-sanctioned power, it is, by definition, not considered to be an abuse when and where it occurs.
In other words, There are three ways a person can obtain the necessities of life: 1) As a dependant, receiving food and shelter from donors (parents, family, church, state); 2) as a producer, providing for his own needs; or 3) as a predator, using force or the threat of force to rob others of the goods and services he needs or wants. An individual who does not want to be, or cannot be, a producer, must become a dependant or a predator or perish. Anything that discourages or prevents peaceful market relations among productive adults -regardless of whether it is due to biological, cultural, economic, or political factorsthus encourages dependency or predation or both. The fact that both are adaptive -that both parasitism and crime 'pay' -accounts for the high incidence of both behaviour patterns in affluent societies and among members of the underclass. Also, because many of the people we call mentally ill engage in de facto predatory behaviour, and because many others use their dependency coercively in a quasi-predatory fashion, the supposedly mysterious connection between crime and mental illness turns out to be no mystery at all. It is simply the result of our penchant for attributing many predatory activities to mental illness.
The results of a NAMI (National Alliance for the Mentally Ill) survey of their membership support my contention about the relationship between (chronic) mental illness and dependency. Asked: 'What does your mentally ill relative do during the day?' respondents described 59 per cent of the patients as completely non-self-supporting, and 14 per cent as spending their days 'in a structured day-treatment programme' (18) .
Minors and other dependants are human beings and belong in and to society. It is wicked to devalue, diminish, or destroy them. But it is absurd to value them more highly than the productive members of society. The legal and political framework of a free society, fit for adults, cannot be based on the needs of dependants and non-producers and on extrapolating from their proper relation to the state to the proper relations of independent adults to the state. Kenneth Minogue makes this point eloquently. He writes: 'The state is essentially an association of independent and resourceful individuals living under law and, from a political point of view, the poor and the needy are nothing less than a threat to our freedom. They are, for example, the materials of the demagogue, who tries to gain power by promising to use the coercive power of the state to redistribute benefits' (19) .
Indeed, the state is not, and cannot be, an association of dependent individuals unable to live under law, because they cannot be held responsible for violating legal prohibitions. Minogue rightly emphasizes that the non-productive members of society pose a threat to liberty by virtue of their dependency and seducibility. Nor is that all. They threaten liberty also because the productive members of society have to take care of them as well as of their guardians. 'None of this,' Minogue cautions, ' is to deny that we have moral and perhaps political duties toward the poor ... [T] he essential point is that to take one's bearings on the nature of the state from the condition of the poor is to start off on the wrong foot. Citizens are categorically different from pensioners' (20) . Citizens are also categorically different from dependants.
These reflections explain why, as the state increasingly treats adults as patients, the language of traditional political philosophy atrophies, and instead we adopt the language of diagnosis and treatment for analyzing the relations of the citizen to the state. In turn, the abandonment of the perspective of political philosophy explains the pemicious disjoining of the mental patient's rights and responsibilities that has been the hallmark of modern mental health legislation. Illustrative of this phenomenon is the fact that the law treats both institutionalized and deinstitutionalized mental patients as competent to retain their right to vote, but not competent to be held responsible for violating the criminal law. 'The abuse of greatness, ' Shakespeare remarks in Julius Caesar, 'is when it disjoins remorse from power' (21) . Similarly, the abuse of power characteristic of the Therapeutic State is that it disjoins liberty from responsibility. Thus, when psychiatrists deprive innocent persons of freedom (civil commitment), they abuse the right to liberty; and when they excuse persons of crimes (diminished capacity and the insanity defence), they pervert the principle that persons are moral agents who should be held accountable for their actions. 
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